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The Nature of AI: 
A Reply to Schank 
Alan Bundy 
University of Edinburgh 
Scotland 
IN HIS ARTICLE IN THE AI MAGAZINE, Vol. IV, NO. 
1, “The Current State of AI: One Man’s Opinion,” Roger 
Schank puts forward various views on the nature of AI. In 
fact, there are enough opinions for four men. That is, the 
views advanced are contradictory. I agree with one of the 
Roger Schanks, and disagree with the other three. 
A fifth answer is also advanced, but is immediately withdrawn. 
This is: 
l The Innovative Answer: “It also usually means get- 
ting a machine to do what previously only humans 
have done before.” 
Schank hoped that his article would start a debate on As &hank points out, this is unsatisfactory because it leads 
the issues he raised. This is my contribution. to a shifting definition of AI. 
&hank’s Four Views of AI 
What are Schank’s four views? 
In answer to his question “What is AI all about?“, he 
claims to see only two possible answers. These are: 
l The Scientific Answer: “that AI is concerned with 
finding out how people think” and 
l The Technological Answer: “that AI is an attempt to 
create certain new technology.” 
Later in the text, two other answers are advanced, and each 
is asserted to be The answer. Thus, we read: 
l The Learning Answer: “an AI program that does not 
learn is no AI program” and 
l The Techniques Answer: “Really what AI is, poten- 
tially, is the algorithmic study of processes in every 
field of inquiry.” 
The Learning Answer 
Another of these answers, the learning answer, can also 
be quickly disposed of. Anyone who attempts to clarify a 
vague term, like AI, is allowed a certain amount of license in 
excluding some uses of the term from his/her definition and 
highlighting other uses, but there are limits to this license. 
The definer must pay some attention to the majority usage 
of the term and to previous definitions. Otherwise, we are in 
a ‘Humpty Dumpty’ world, where words mean ‘what I want 
them to mean’, and communication becomes impossible. The 
learning answer is just too far from the majority view to be 
tenable. As Schank himself has said, the learning answer 
would exclude most previous AI work. So what would that 
work then be called? 
The only way that I can make sense of the learning 
answer is as part of a definition of AI as the attempt to 
build the all-singing, all-dancing, artificial person. Since 
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people learn, any AI program must learn, but so must it sing 
and dance! This definition not only excludes all known AI 
programs, but all those we are likely to build in the next 100 
years. AI will not exist until it is achieved! 
This seems to be what is behind Schank’s claim that 
“It is important that AI concentrate on building complex in- 
tegrated systems that make some stab at doing a total walk 
through of some real task.” There is some truth in this, but 
it would be bad methodology to build only complex systems. 
‘Divide and conquer’ is as true for AI as for any science. We 
need to develop and study individual techniques and their 
properties as well as put them together into integrated sys- 
tems. We must also study techniques for the clean integra- 
tion of small systems to make big systems. Our experiences 
with integrated systems can then feed back into the redesign 
of their constituent parts. Otherwise, we will wallow in con- 
fusion. 
Reconciling the Remaining Three Views 
couraged to develop a more precise terminology for describ- 
ing AI techniques, to explore the tradeoffs of different tech- 
niques, to appreciate the value of negative results, and to 
extend and improve existing techniques. 
We will also be in a better position to assess AI research, 
including Ph.D. theses and conference papers-two areas 
where Schank complains about standards. For instance, even 
another rule-based system has a research role if it extenbs our 
understanding of the limitations/potential of production rule 
systems as a computational technique,2 but the outcome has 
to be at least mildly surprising (e.g. Max Bramer’s difficulties 
in implementing MYCIN in EMYCIN). There is no doubt 
that most such systems are uninteresting from the research 
point of view, but this is precisely because of the lack of ap- 
preciation by their implementors of how they could be use- 
ful in drawing attention to the limitations of the rule-based 
technique. The implementors usually try to hide any such 
limitation, lest it cost them their Ph.D., and are encouraged 
to do so by the refereeing system of the field. 
The remaining three Schankian views are less easily dis- Mainstream AI as Applied Mathematics 
posed of because each corresponds to a popular definition 
of all or part of Al. Faced with conflicting definitions of a 
concept, one standard device is to divide the concept into 
subconcepts so that each definition corresponds to one sub- 
concept. It is standard to so divide the AI field into the 
‘technological’ subfield, e.g. knowledge engineering, and the 
‘scientific’ subfield, e.g. computational psychology. &hank’s 
technological and scientific answers reflect just this subdivi- 
sion. 
But this twofold subdivision does not accommodate the 
techniques answer. For that, as I have argued elsewhere,l 
we need a three-fold subdivision. The third subfield I call 
‘mainstream AI’, because it is what most AI researchers are 
actually engaged on most of the time, namely: 
The investigation of computational techniques which 
have the potential for exhibiting intelligent behavior. 
Very few AI researchers actually put in the develop- 
ment work required to produce a technological product with 
commercial potential. Very few AI researchers conduct 
the experiments necessary to show that their program has 
psychological validity. Most AI researchers try to build a 
program whcih performs some task that no previous pro- 
gram has been able to perform, and in the process they 
develop new techniques or explore the potential of existing 
techniques. 
This is not the only methodology for investigating Al 
techniques, but it is the most popular. Once-the AT com- 
munity recognizes that investigating techniques is what they 
are about, then the methodology of the field will be liberated 
from the mental chaos of big program building, with enor- 
mous benefit for the future development of AI. We will be en- 
1 “Some suggested criteria for assessing AI research,” AISB Quarterly 
40-41, 1981 
What is the relationship between mainstream AI, know- 
ledge engineering, computational psychology and computer 
science? I believe it can be best seen by drawing an anal- 
ogy with applied mathematics, engineering, physics and pure 
mathematics, respectively. Just as applied mathematics in- 
vestigates those areas of mathematics which can be used to 
model physical phenomena, so AI investigates those com- 
putational techniques which can be used to model cogni- 
tive phenomena. Just as applied mathematics was often 
in the forefront of discovering or motivating mathematical 
advances, e.g. calculus, so AI is often in the forefront of 
discovering or motivating computational techniques, e.g. in- 
ference. Neither applied mathematics nor mainstream AI 
is an empirical science, i.e. they are not studies of natural 
phenomena, only of abstract entities, e.g. numbers and net- 
works. However, both can be applied to empirical sciences 
such as physics and psychology, and both can be applied to 
technologies such as mechanical engineering or knowledge 
engineering. 
Of course, the analogy breaks down at points ‘The na- 
ture of an AI model’ is different from an applied mathe- 
matics model. No one would claim that planets make arith- 
metic calculations before deciding what grativation attrac- 
tion to exert, but computational psychologists do claim that 
human mental processes can be regarded as computational 
‘calculation’. 
Does it Matter? 
Does it matter what view one takes of the nature of AI? 
‘A similar story applies to the linguistics theses despised by Schank, 
which applied transformational grammar to yet another language The 
linguists were investigating the limitations/potential of the syntactic 
apparatus. 
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It does. The problems that prompted Schank to write 
his article are important, and different views of the nature of 
AI suggest different solutions to these problems. We consider 
some of these problems and solutions below. 
“The field has always been somewhat fragmented,” with 
lack of agreement about its goals and methodology. Each 
of the five views above suggests different goals and different 
methodologies. Many researchers simultaneously hold a mix- 
ture of these views, which causes them confusion about what 
research to do and how to do it. Any success in clarifying the 
nature of AI should also help to sort out this confusion. The 
techniques answer advanced above suggests the goal of de- 
veloping and investigating techniques. This can be done not 
only by building programs, but also by teasing out neat tech- 
niques from scruffy programs, and by explicit comparison of 
techniques. 
There is wide disagreement about “what constitutes a 
reasonable piece of AI research.” This is witnessed by the 
large number (507) f o o conference and journal articles where 
one referee recommends acceptance and the other rejection. 
I explicitly addressed this problem in my AISBQ 40-41 ar- 
ticle, where I tried to show how the techniques answer sug- 
gests criteria for assessing AI research. One theme of that ar- 
ticle was that there was wide agreement on what constitutes 
bad research, and that one could extract criteria from these 
agreements by negating the reasons fo rejecting pieces of 
work. 
The discovery that AI can be applied commercially has 
created several problems: a shortage of people, the danger of 
neglecting fundamental research, the danger of a backlash if 
AI does not deliver. These are all aspects of a single prob- 
lem: ignorance-ignorance about how to do AI research,, ig- 
norance of the nature and need for fundamental research, 
and ignorance about what AI has to offer commerce. The 
applied mathematic analogy implies that fundamental re- 
search in AI is the development and investigation of AI tech- 
niques and that applied research is the application of these 
techniques. If these definitions were taken seriously then AI 
would be easier to teach and its contribution to commerce 
easier to appreciate. 
(continued from page 35 1 
crop of judgmental expert systems, a qualitative Bayesian 
machine may be the perfect tool. 
Unfortunately, as mentioned previously, algorithms and 
techniques (approximate, probabilistic, or otherwise) for 
mechanizing these computations have not yet been worked 
out, and there is some chance that these computations are 
provably infeasible even for supercomputers. Also requiring 
attention is adaptation of any success with logic-based sys- 
tems to the alternative non-logical production systems, for 
the same general ideas involved in Carnap’s constructions 
apply even when logical structure is not available-see Doyle, 
1982 for suggestions. 
There are also other functionalities one might desire of 
supercomputers in addition to those discussed above, such 
as the ability to supply proofs when answering deductive 
questions, and the ability to make non-monotonic, reasoned 
assumptions. The former are invaluable in explanations, the 
latter important in problem-solving and representation. But 
we cannot pursue these here, except to note that both fit 
well with the proposed constructional approach (Doyle, 1982, 
1983a, 1983b). 
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